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Andrew Buchanan. American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean
during World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Pp. 311.
The Mediterranean region during the Second World War was in
many ways the staging area for the eventual defeat of the Axis
powers. It was here that the United States, along with its British and
Commonwealth allies, began their major counter-offensives against
Fascist Italy and Germany leading to heavy combat on land, sea and
air, culminating in an Allied victory. Andrew Buchanan, a senior
lecturer at the University of Vermont, offers a new interpretation of
the U.S. experience in the region with his new book American Grand
Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II. Buchanan
argues that the U.S. did not view the Mediterranean as a “peripheral
theater,” but developed grand-strategic interests in the region which
were secured by the successful interlinking of political, military and
economic power. Essentially, the author effectively demonstrates how
the success of this regional grand strategy allowed the Mediterranean
to be most accurately described as an “American lake” by the end of
the war and how the transformation of U.S. strategy occurred over
time.
The popular narrative of the Mediterranean theatre is that the
U.S. was more of a reluctant participant in the region, and that it
was the British who were the leading force behind Allied strategy and
operations.1 However, the interesting revision offered by Buchanan is
that U.S. participation was not reluctant and was driven by certain
U.S. political elites, including President Roosevelt. Interestingly,
Buchannan compares Roosevelt’s view of grand strategy in the
Mediterranean to that of famous navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who
emphasised accumulating new bases and zones of control. Roosevelt’s
regional interests clashed with the strategic tunnel vision of senior
U.S. military officials who were focused on how to defeat the Axis
as quickly as possible and were not thinking of the peace that would
come in the post-war period. The author’s analysis goes well beyond

1  
See James Lacey, “Towards a Strategy: Creating an American Strategy for Global
War, 1940-1943,” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War,
Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey, eds. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Michael Howard, The Mediterranean
Strategy in the Second World War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).
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just the military sphere of the war, but demonstrates how the U.S.
utilised diplomatic networks (both formal and informal) as well as
economic power to help shape the region to acquiesce to its interests.
For example, Buchanan shows how, starting in 1944, the U.S. used
its economic might to help rebuild Italy, which gave it considerable
influence during that country’s post-Fascist political development
and helped slide it under the umbrella of an emerging U.S.-led liberal
world order.
The book details the evolution of the U.S. experience in the
Mediterranean throughout the war. It discusses how the U.S. used a
mix of diplomatic appeasement and economic relations to guarantee
Spain’s neutrality and how the U.S. balanced relations between
the Vichy and the Free French political communities. It outlines
how, following the launching of Operation Torch, U.S. military and
diplomatic personnel found themselves with a complicated new task of
having to administer European colonies in Africa. The later chapters
of the book deal with the invasion and occupation of Italy and of
relations with the Balkans. The narrative avoids detailed overviews
of the operational- and tactical-level fighting, rather focusing the bulk
of its attention on the political and economic dimensions of the war
and their interplay with military strategy. To support his analysis,
Buchanan undertook extensive archival research in both the U.S. and
U.K. as well as examined the unpublished private papers of several
key diplomatic figures.
An underlying theme found throughout the book is the interplay
of the pursuit of a realpolitik approach to national interests and
the influence of liberal normative factors in shaping U.S. foreign
policy. Pragmatic realpolitik was often at the forefront of U.S. policy,
particularly during the early days of the war when the U.S. was in
a weaker position. For example, Roosevelt recognised the legitimacy
of the authoritarian Franco government in Spain and the Vichy
government in France and later upheld stability in French colonial
Africa. However, liberalism was able to grow in influence as the U.S.
strategic position grew stronger, and by 1944 the U.S. began to more
actively reshape the region with liberal principles in mind. Overall,
Buchanan’s analysis here is sound, yet could have been strengthened
by engaging with some of the literature on U.S. strategic culture which
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has extensively examined this interplay of liberalism and pragmatism
and on how normative factors influence the development of policy.2
At its core, this book is really a story of rising hegemony and
power transition, where emerging great powers reshape the world
around them to fit their interests. The international system is
consistently in a state of flux where states’ capabilities in relation
to peer actors are either rising or declining.3 Buchanan’s book shows
how, by the end of 1944, the U.S. was able to surpass the influence of
the U.K. in the Mediterranean militarily, politically and economically.
The U.K. lacked the resources possessed by the U.S. and so it was
Washington, not London, which oversaw the construction of the new
political dynamics of the region. This process was very complicated as,
Buchanan observes, “[t]here was no manual—no Global Hegemony
for Dummies—to guide U.S. policy makers toward becoming the
predominant power in the capitalist world” (p. 272). However,
Buchanan concludes that the U.S. managed to overcome these
difficulties, and the construction of the new liberal world order would
continue into the post-war era with events such as the establishment
of the Truman Doctrine.
This book succeeds as a comprehensive and convincing analysis of
America’s grand strategy in the Mediterranean. It is worthy of study
by scholars of American diplomatic history, Anglo-U.S. relations, and,
of course, the Mediterranean region during the Second World War.
Further, international relations’ scholars interested in the processes of
peaceful power-transitions and how new global orders are constructed
will find the work useful. Buchanan’s engaging writing style will
also appeal to even a casual reader of Second World War history
interested in something beyond purely military-centric narratives of
such an important period in human history.
alexander salt , university of calgary

2  
For example, Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,”
International Security 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981): 21-47.
3  
For more on the nature of Great Power politics, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); and A.F.K. Organski
and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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